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1962/10/21

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM:

OADR

From [unclear] 26

TO: S Weiss
R. Garthoff

SUBJECT: Proposed Courses of Action

1. The question is incorrectly stated. The real question is "what do we do if the Soviets fail to dismantle the missile sites in face of a limited blockade"? Current activity could well continue for a time on the basis of materiel already present in Cuba. Even if the Soviets halted construction, they could continue to maintain the existing capability.

2. Concerning the alternative I have three comments:

(i) Rather than imposing a total blockade at once, incremental steps toward a total blockade could be taken by adding an air blockade (for which plans are already in train), a blockade of POL products and, finally, a blockade of food and medicines. In time (75 days?) a POL blockade would severely hamper the Cuban military machine and economy. A total blockade would ultimately (date?) generate severe internal pressures against the regime and/or face the regime and the USSR with the choice of escalating the conflict or negotiating. It seems to me that the threat of such an outcome, which anyone could foresee, would constitute the negotiating trade-off--not necessarily concessions by us elsewhere, e.g., Turkey or Italy. Depending on how Krushchev values his present beachhead, this

course might be very efficacious.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEWED BY: [unclear] 2/10/68
(ii) Negotiations in conjunction with maintenance of and/or

REVIEWED BY: [unclear]	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IS/FPC/CDR 2/1	Date: 4/13/62
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() CLASSIFY	() CLASSIFY	() CLASSIFY	() CLASSIFY
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increasing military pressure is another course of action.

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